Read Judge McAfee’s Ruling on Disqualifying Fani Willis in Georgia Trump Case

on grounds of public policy, as “[t]he administration of the law should be free from all temptation

and suspicion, so far as human agency is capable of accomplishing that object[.]” Gaulden v. State, 11 Ga. 47, 50 (1852) (disqualifying solicitor-general on grounds of public policy); Conley v. Arnold, 93 Ga. 823, 825 (1894) (against public policy for solicitor-general to represent clients, though allegation was untimely); Baker v. State, 97 Ga. 452, 454 (1895) (holding “propriety” demands that the solicitor-general cannot personally prosecute a case in which he was “personally concerned”); Howard v. State, 115 Ga. 244, 249 (1902) (finding “[p]ublic policy[,] good morals and justice” prevent side-switching); Nichols v. State, 17 Ga. App. 593, 606 (1916) (physical precedent only) (“The administration of the law, and especially that of the criminal law, should, like Caesar’s wife, be above suspicion, and should be free from all temptation, bias, or prejudice …”).

The Georgia Supreme Court has most recently denoted conflicts of interest and forensic misconduct as the two generally recognized grounds for disqualification. Reed v. State, 314 Ga. 534, 545 (2022) (citing Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305, 314 (1988)).² A conflict of interest includes acquiring a “personal interest or stake in the defendant’s conviction.” Williams, 258 Ga. at 314; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 374 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “conflict of interest” as “[a] real or seeming incompatibility between one’s private interests and one’s public or fiduciary duties”). In such circumstances, no showing of prejudice by a defendant is required. Amusement Sales, Inc. v. State of Ga., 316 Ga. App. 727, 736 (2012) (citing Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987)).

2 While McGlynn v. State, 342 Ga. App. 170, 173 (2017) indicated without citation or further explanation that disqualification allegations require a “high standard of proof,” neither the Court of Appeals, nor any other appellate opinion, has provided enlightenment on where exactly this relative “high standard” falls on the evidentiary spectrum. The Court believes McGlynn offers little, if any, guidance to the analysis at hand.

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