Read the Court’s Decision to Overrule the Chevron Doctrine - The World News

Read the Court’s Decision to Overrule the Chevron Doctrine

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LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO
Opinion of the Court
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022) (quoting
Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457,
468 (2001); alteration in original). Nor have we applied
Chevron to agency interpretations of judicial review provi-
sions, see Adams Fruit Co., 494 U. S., at 649–650, or to stat-
utory schemes not administered by the agency seeking def-
erence, see Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497, 519–
520 (2018). And we have sent mixed signals on whether
Chevron applies when a statute has criminal applications.
Compare Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169, 191
(2014), with Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities
for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 704, n. 18 (1995).
Confronted with this byzantine set of preconditions and
exceptions, some courts have simply bypassed Chevron,
saying it makes no difference for one reason or another.”
And even when they do invoke Chevron, courts do not al-
ways heed the various steps and nuances of that evolving
doctrine. In one of the cases before us today, for example,
the First Circuit both skipped “step zero,” see 62 F. 4th, at
628, and refused to “classify [its] conclusion as a product of
Chevron step one or step two”—though it ultimately ap-
pears to have deferred under step two, id., at 634.
7 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explo-
sives, 45 F. 4th 306, 313–314 (CADC 2022), abrogated by Garland v. Car-
gill, 602 U. S. (2024); County of Amador v. United States Dept. of
Interior, 872 F. 3d 1012, 1021–1022 (CA9 2017); Estrada-Rodriguez v.
Lynch, 825 F. 3d 397, 403-404 (CA8 2016); Nielsen v. AECOM Tech.
Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 220 (CA2 2014); Alaska Stock, LLC v. Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Co., 747 F. 3d 673, 685, n. 52 (CA9 2014);
Jurado-Delgado v. Attorney Gen. of U. S., 498 Fed. Appx. 107, 117 (CA3
2009); see also D. Brookins, Confusion in the Circuit Courts: How the
Circuit Courts Are Solving the Mead-Puzzle by Avoiding It Altogether,
85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1484, 1496–1499 (2017) (documenting Chevron
avoidance by the lower courts); A. Vermeule, Our Schmittian Adminis-
trative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095, 1127–1129 (2009) (same); L. Bress-
man, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1464-1466 (2005) (same).

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