Read the Summary of the Secret Service’s Internal Review

USSS – Public Disclosure
Introduction
Since July 13, 2024, the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) has fielded a
number of questions surrounding Thomas Crooks’ attempted assassination of former
President of the United States/Republican Presidential Nominee (FPOTUS/RPN)
Donald Trump. This includes questions regarding the agency’s organizational culture,
executive oversight, operational leadership, and details regarding employee actions
that may have contributed to the mission failure.
The Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility is conducting a mission
assurance inquiry that will address these questions. A summary of that office’s initial
mission assurance report, which identifies potential causes for the July 13th mission
failure, is provided below. It will be followed by a supplemental report that will provide
recommendations for agency leadership.
Even before the conclusion of the mission assurance inquiry, the agency made
enhancements to FPOTUS/RPN Trump’s protection. It should also be noted that the
Secret Service’s internal recommendations are separate from those that will result
from external inquires conducted by Congress, the White House/Department of
Homeland Security’s Internal Review Panel, and the Department of Homeland
Security Office of the Inspector General.
This summary will primarily focus on deficiencies in the Secret Service protective
advance, along with the agency’s interactions with its state and local law enforcement
partners, prior to the July 13th attack. The summary also addresses the agency’s
demanding operational tempo and how it may have contributed to mission failure.
Command and Control / State and Local Law Enforcement Partners
The Secret Service is the ultimate responsible party for the security planning at our
protective venues. Accordingly, ensuring that our state and local counterparts have a
clear understanding of our operational requirements and function is key to mission
success. Advance team personnel have an obligation to ensure that state and local
support from law enforcement in all capacities meets the protective requirements and
principles of Secret Service methodologies. However, interviews of Secret Service
personnel and partnering agencies revealed discrepancies in the understanding and
expectations of how various elements of the site security planning would be
accomplished.
The Secret Service does not ask our state and local law enforcement partners to
support protective operations by operating beyond the scope of their expertise. That
would not be prudent and would invite unintended consequences. For example, when
executing a comprehensive security plan involving state or local tactical assets, such
as a sniper team, the placement of those units is sometimes made in consultation with
the local tactical units and is not a unilateral decision by Secret Service personnel.
Conversely, the location or placement of state or local tactical assets must not be